Open Verification

Draw Verification

Choose Your Combat Patrol or Spearhead

Provably fair — cryptographic Draw complete

Draw Result

Winner: Nicks, Essex
Winning ticket: #113
Entries in pool: 63 (all entrants)
Winner index: 35 (0-based)
Draw executed: 22 Sep 2026, 8:31 PM
Entropy source: secrets.SystemRandom (instant-win positions at setup)
Fairness mechanism: SHA-256 commit-reveal — selection by sha256(legion-draw-v1:draw:draw_secret:pool_hash:drand_randomness:counter) rejection sampling

How This Result Was Produced

7 steps, each one checkable against the values published below. Nothing here depends on trusting us — every input is shown.

Verify commitment was published before the draw

This sha256 hash was published when the competition was created. It proves the draw_secret could not have been changed after tickets were sold.

463dcd69c8d6c792608ef2b0975617c6d7128d672e8803f0b2e6b444e1c95716

Verify the pool-freeze commitment was published before the beacon round

sha256 of the exact UTF-8 string 'legion-draw-v1:pool_freeze:' + pool_hash + ':' + drand_chain_hash + ':' + str(round_number) — colon-separated, no spaces, no trailing newline. Published before the targeted round resolved, it pins both the entry pool and the round while the round's randomness was still unknowable. Rebuild it from this page's published values with the command below.

f7efc69cbe174c16abf4413c95ce44905f4e0cfa0ae1ab4ef6d484879af71dfb

python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha256('legion-draw-v1:pool_freeze:baa78c818a1f4b51a3862583f261800acf74fae83fdfce1894b554e769a199da:52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971:32434025'.encode()).hexdigest())"

Verify draw_secret matches commitment_hash

The draw_secret is revealed below. sha256(draw_secret) is shown — it must equal the commitment_hash in step 1.

draw_secret (input)

6a1cd19e480be2d4de748b4c12da71502eb840a1befa33ca87553f4575453689

sha256(draw_secret) must equal step 1

463dcd69c8d6c792608ef2b0975617c6d7128d672e8803f0b2e6b444e1c95716

Verify the entry pool hash

sha256 of every ticket number in the draw pool, in ascending numeric order, joined with commas and no spaces.

baa78c818a1f4b51a3862583f261800acf74fae83fdfce1894b554e769a199da

Verify the drand beacon randomness

Round 32434025 of the public drand randomness beacon (chain 52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971). This value is published independently by multiple operators and could not have been known when the pool above was frozen. Check it yourself: fetch https://api.drand.sh/52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971/public/32434025, hex-decode the response's 'signature' field into raw bytes, then compute sha256 of those bytes — it must match the value shown here. (Hashing the ASCII hex text of the signature instead of the decoded bytes gives a different, wrong answer.) The command below does exactly that.

792bd6fd1072a0728607bb17badc703c374eb02d2671977393ebcf943bb40330

python3 -c "import hashlib, json, urllib.request; r = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen('https://api.drand.sh/52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971/public/32434025')); print(hashlib.sha256(bytes.fromhex(r['signature'])).hexdigest())"

Verify the beacon's BLS signature

Before accepting the randomness above, the platform checked drand's BLS12-381 signature for this round against this chain public key — a relay can withhold a round but cannot forge one without drand's private key. Fetch the round's 'signature' field from the URL above and verify e(H(round_bytes), public_key) == e(signature, G2_generator) yourself with any BLS12-381 library; source: https://drand.love/developer/http-api/.

83cf0f2896adee7eb8b5f01fcad3912212c437e0073e911fb90022d3e760183c8c4b450b6a0a6c3ac6a5776a2d1064510d1fec758c921cc22b0e17e63aaf4bcb5ed66304de9cf809bd274ca73bab4af5a6e9c76a4bc09e76eae8991ef5ece45a

Reproduce the winner selection (rejection sampling)

Starting at counter=0, compute sha256(f'legion-draw-v1:draw:{draw_secret}:{pool_hash}:{drand_randomness}:{counter}') as a 256-bit integer. Let limit be the largest multiple of N below 2^256. If the value is >= limit, increment counter and retry. Otherwise winner_index = value mod N.

counter=0, winner_index=35

Check It Yourself

Run every check in your own browser. It recomputes the hashes and the winner selection locally from the values published on this page, and fetches the drand round directly from the public relays — nothing is sent to our servers, so a pass cannot depend on trusting us.

Confirm sha256(draw_secret) equals the commitment hash in step 1.
Confirm the sha256 of the entry pool below equals the pool hash in step 3. Hash the text exactly as shown — ticket numbers in ascending numeric order, separated by commas, with no spaces and no trailing newline.

Entry pool — ticket numbers in ascending numeric order
10,13,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,28,29,30,39,40,41,45,49,57,63,66,69,72,79,81,83,86,87,94,95,96,97,100,104,105,110,113,116,120,122,130,131,134,135,146,150,154,155,157,162,163,164,167,168,169,170,173,176,183,191,196,197,198,199

Run the pre-filled command below to reproduce the beacon-seeded rejection-sampling winner index (counter=?, expected winner_index=35). This folds in the drand beacon randomness from the step above alongside the draw secret and pool hash, so the winner could not have been known until that round resolved.

python3 - <<'PY'
import hashlib
draw_secret = '6a1cd19e480be2d4de748b4c12da71502eb840a1befa33ca87553f4575453689'
pool_hash = 'baa78c818a1f4b51a3862583f261800acf74fae83fdfce1894b554e769a199da'
beacon_randomness = '792bd6fd1072a0728607bb17badc703c374eb02d2671977393ebcf943bb40330'
total_entries = 63
counter = 0
limit = (1 << 256) - ((1 << 256) % total_entries)
while True:
    seed = hashlib.sha256(f'legion-draw-v1:draw:{draw_secret}:{pool_hash}:{beacon_randomness}:{counter}'.encode()).digest()
    candidate = int.from_bytes(seed[:32], 'big')
    if candidate < limit:
        print(f'counter={counter} winner_index={candidate % total_entries}')
        break
    counter += 1
PY

Full Entry List

All sold tickets with entry method (no personal names). This competition had no engagement question, so the file carries no answer column. Download it to cross-reference ticket numbers against the draw pool; the "In Main Draw" column marks which rows formed it.

Download entry list CSV

Independent Timestamp Proof

Each commitment hash is anchored to the Bitcoin blockchain via OpenTimestamps. A confirmed proof establishes the hash existed before the Bitcoin block that attests it — checkable without trusting our records. Save the commitment hash to a file and check the proof with the free ots tool: printf '%s' 'COMMITMENT_HASH' > commitment.txt && ots verify -f commitment.txt proof.ots

Draw commitment — anchored in Bitcoin 16 Sep 2026 00:04 UTC

463dcd69c8d6c792608ef2b0975617c6d7128d672e8803f0b2e6b444e1c95716 Download OTS proof

Instant win commitment — anchored in Bitcoin 16 Sep 2026 00:05 UTC

3743d92d1303d165210514df7c7a5469da3eaa5f7815f56415e459ef7e604c22 Download OTS proof

Pool freeze commitment — anchored in Bitcoin 22 Sep 2026 22:04 UTC

f7efc69cbe174c16abf4413c95ce44905f4e0cfa0ae1ab4ef6d484879af71dfb

What this proof does and does not show: Bitcoin confirmation takes hours, while the targeted drand round resolves seconds after the pool freeze — so a confirmed proof here demonstrates the pool-freeze commitment existed before its attesting block, not that the freeze happened before the drand round. The freeze-before-round ordering rests on the commitment having been published before the round resolved (step 2 above) and on our audit records.

Download OTS proof