Open Verification

Draw Verification

Choose Your Combat Patrol or Spearhead

Provably fair — cryptographic Draw complete

Draw Result

Winner: Webb, Somerset
Winning ticket: #50
Entries in pool: 66 (all entrants)
Winner index: 21 (0-based)
Draw executed: 29 Sep 2026, 8:31 PM
Entropy source: secrets.SystemRandom (instant-win positions at setup)
Fairness mechanism: SHA-256 commit-reveal — selection by sha256(legion-draw-v1:draw:draw_secret:pool_hash:drand_randomness:counter) rejection sampling

How This Result Was Produced

7 steps, each one checkable against the values published below. Nothing here depends on trusting us — every input is shown.

Verify commitment was published before the draw

This sha256 hash was published when the competition was created. It proves the draw_secret could not have been changed after tickets were sold.

f5f36520894308183db775b20ed57fd812ba1c8482d231cfd1ec81908ce769c0

Verify the pool-freeze commitment was published before the beacon round

sha256 of the exact UTF-8 string 'legion-draw-v1:pool_freeze:' + pool_hash + ':' + drand_chain_hash + ':' + str(round_number) — colon-separated, no spaces, no trailing newline. Published before the targeted round resolved, it pins both the entry pool and the round while the round's randomness was still unknowable. Rebuild it from this page's published values with the command below.

c31a179f4ebe8833f96be03eb693fd35bf7e03aac12f73311ba6440d45ba7a1c

python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha256('legion-draw-v1:pool_freeze:b7b344b35df6aa7ab8913c4e13a11a5090799a5a45d2f89dd01a0127b7288426:52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971:32635625'.encode()).hexdigest())"

Verify draw_secret matches commitment_hash

The draw_secret is revealed below. sha256(draw_secret) is shown — it must equal the commitment_hash in step 1.

draw_secret (input)

297391e5c2e0ed3a99216a3e6fbf726939fb5d573331c8b09249a9702fb26089

sha256(draw_secret) must equal step 1

f5f36520894308183db775b20ed57fd812ba1c8482d231cfd1ec81908ce769c0

Verify the entry pool hash

sha256 of every ticket number in the draw pool, in ascending numeric order, joined with commas and no spaces.

b7b344b35df6aa7ab8913c4e13a11a5090799a5a45d2f89dd01a0127b7288426

Verify the drand beacon randomness

Round 32635625 of the public drand randomness beacon (chain 52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971). This value is published independently by multiple operators and could not have been known when the pool above was frozen. Check it yourself: fetch https://api.drand.sh/52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971/public/32635625, hex-decode the response's 'signature' field into raw bytes, then compute sha256 of those bytes — it must match the value shown here. (Hashing the ASCII hex text of the signature instead of the decoded bytes gives a different, wrong answer.) The command below does exactly that.

be8b6521997fb2ec4ac33d3360a413c78c0472e141e6c67e17e5b9550bdaea7b

python3 -c "import hashlib, json, urllib.request; r = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen('https://api.drand.sh/52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971/public/32635625')); print(hashlib.sha256(bytes.fromhex(r['signature'])).hexdigest())"

Verify the beacon's BLS signature

Before accepting the randomness above, the platform checked drand's BLS12-381 signature for this round against this chain public key — a relay can withhold a round but cannot forge one without drand's private key. Fetch the round's 'signature' field from the URL above and verify e(H(round_bytes), public_key) == e(signature, G2_generator) yourself with any BLS12-381 library; source: https://drand.love/developer/http-api/.

83cf0f2896adee7eb8b5f01fcad3912212c437e0073e911fb90022d3e760183c8c4b450b6a0a6c3ac6a5776a2d1064510d1fec758c921cc22b0e17e63aaf4bcb5ed66304de9cf809bd274ca73bab4af5a6e9c76a4bc09e76eae8991ef5ece45a

Reproduce the winner selection (rejection sampling)

Starting at counter=0, compute sha256(f'legion-draw-v1:draw:{draw_secret}:{pool_hash}:{drand_randomness}:{counter}') as a 256-bit integer. Let limit be the largest multiple of N below 2^256. If the value is >= limit, increment counter and retry. Otherwise winner_index = value mod N.

counter=0, winner_index=21

Check It Yourself

Run every check in your own browser. It recomputes the hashes and the winner selection locally from the values published on this page, and fetches the drand round directly from the public relays — nothing is sent to our servers, so a pass cannot depend on trusting us.

Confirm sha256(draw_secret) equals the commitment hash in step 1.
Confirm the sha256 of the entry pool below equals the pool hash in step 3. Hash the text exactly as shown — ticket numbers in ascending numeric order, separated by commas, with no spaces and no trailing newline.

Entry pool — ticket numbers in ascending numeric order
1,3,5,6,7,9,15,16,18,20,22,26,27,31,32,34,36,38,44,45,47,50,54,58,59,65,70,76,86,87,90,93,95,97,99,101,107,113,115,118,121,122,132,133,135,137,138,141,142,145,151,158,159,160,162,164,168,173,177,178,180,182,184,185,186,189

Run the pre-filled command below to reproduce the beacon-seeded rejection-sampling winner index (counter=?, expected winner_index=21). This folds in the drand beacon randomness from the step above alongside the draw secret and pool hash, so the winner could not have been known until that round resolved.

python3 - <<'PY'
import hashlib
draw_secret = '297391e5c2e0ed3a99216a3e6fbf726939fb5d573331c8b09249a9702fb26089'
pool_hash = 'b7b344b35df6aa7ab8913c4e13a11a5090799a5a45d2f89dd01a0127b7288426'
beacon_randomness = 'be8b6521997fb2ec4ac33d3360a413c78c0472e141e6c67e17e5b9550bdaea7b'
total_entries = 66
counter = 0
limit = (1 << 256) - ((1 << 256) % total_entries)
while True:
    seed = hashlib.sha256(f'legion-draw-v1:draw:{draw_secret}:{pool_hash}:{beacon_randomness}:{counter}'.encode()).digest()
    candidate = int.from_bytes(seed[:32], 'big')
    if candidate < limit:
        print(f'counter={counter} winner_index={candidate % total_entries}')
        break
    counter += 1
PY

Full Entry List

All sold tickets with entry method (no personal names). This competition had no engagement question, so the file carries no answer column. Download it to cross-reference ticket numbers against the draw pool; the "In Main Draw" column marks which rows formed it.

Download entry list CSV

Independent Timestamp Proof

Each commitment hash is anchored to the Bitcoin blockchain via OpenTimestamps. A confirmed proof establishes the hash existed before the Bitcoin block that attests it — checkable without trusting our records. Save the commitment hash to a file and check the proof with the free ots tool: printf '%s' 'COMMITMENT_HASH' > commitment.txt && ots verify -f commitment.txt proof.ots

Draw commitment — anchored in Bitcoin 23 Sep 2026 10:05 UTC

f5f36520894308183db775b20ed57fd812ba1c8482d231cfd1ec81908ce769c0 Download OTS proof

Instant win commitment — anchored in Bitcoin 23 Sep 2026 09:05 UTC

154436f1abc8b363bea9e58fc5dc5031958086dda0e0796b9dce00ae84c4fc6e Download OTS proof

Pool freeze commitment — anchored in Bitcoin 29 Sep 2026 23:04 UTC

c31a179f4ebe8833f96be03eb693fd35bf7e03aac12f73311ba6440d45ba7a1c

What this proof does and does not show: Bitcoin confirmation takes hours, while the targeted drand round resolves seconds after the pool freeze — so a confirmed proof here demonstrates the pool-freeze commitment existed before its attesting block, not that the freeze happened before the drand round. The freeze-before-round ordering rests on the commitment having been published before the round resolved (step 2 above) and on our audit records.

Download OTS proof