Open Verification

Draw Verification

CHOOSE YOUR KILL TEAM + PRIMER

Provably fair — cryptographic Draw complete

Draw Result

Winner: Von Grimm, Roxburghshire
Winning ticket: #60
Entries in pool: 49 (all entrants)
Winner index: 9 (0-based)
Draw executed: 1 Sep 2026, 8:36 PM
Entropy source: secrets.SystemRandom (instant-win positions at setup)
Fairness mechanism: SHA-256 commit-reveal — selection by sha256(legion-draw-v1:draw:draw_secret:pool_hash:drand_randomness:counter) rejection sampling

How This Result Was Produced

7 steps, each one checkable against the values published below. Nothing here depends on trusting us — every input is shown.

Verify commitment was published before the draw

This sha256 hash was published when the competition was created. It proves the draw_secret could not have been changed after tickets were sold.

7ef4db3ae348ddf5a591cb9c2fa8ceda5e2a090c819f46b674575ad4e29790f2

Verify the pool-freeze commitment was published before the beacon round

sha256 of the exact UTF-8 string 'legion-draw-v1:pool_freeze:' + pool_hash + ':' + drand_chain_hash + ':' + str(round_number) — colon-separated, no spaces, no trailing newline. Published before the targeted round resolved, it pins both the entry pool and the round while the round's randomness was still unknowable. Rebuild it from this page's published values with the command below.

cab0dacfbcf39135a99e6cdbbaf1e2a2ba084793101a00f42a6ba9b74e7d1ae9

python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha256('legion-draw-v1:pool_freeze:d42f0ca6591d14768f88211d190715d3feb197cb375078e06d3aa55f52c5537a:52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971:31829321'.encode()).hexdigest())"

Verify draw_secret matches commitment_hash

The draw_secret is revealed below. sha256(draw_secret) is shown — it must equal the commitment_hash in step 1.

draw_secret (input)

e4526e4420436bcd6c4e911d6fb143944cfccf707123fff991e8d76675b5473e

sha256(draw_secret) must equal step 1

7ef4db3ae348ddf5a591cb9c2fa8ceda5e2a090c819f46b674575ad4e29790f2

Verify the entry pool hash

sha256 of every ticket number in the draw pool, in ascending numeric order, joined with commas and no spaces.

d42f0ca6591d14768f88211d190715d3feb197cb375078e06d3aa55f52c5537a

Verify the drand beacon randomness

Round 31829321 of the public drand randomness beacon (chain 52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971). This value is published independently by multiple operators and could not have been known when the pool above was frozen. Check it yourself: fetch https://api.drand.sh/52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971/public/31829321, hex-decode the response's 'signature' field into raw bytes, then compute sha256 of those bytes — it must match the value shown here. (Hashing the ASCII hex text of the signature instead of the decoded bytes gives a different, wrong answer.) The command below does exactly that.

bcc62bd7d25fa301d5fb19cc6cdeef7b6d02db06d4c99d6db743786cfbba4c3d

python3 -c "import hashlib, json, urllib.request; r = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen('https://api.drand.sh/52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971/public/31829321')); print(hashlib.sha256(bytes.fromhex(r['signature'])).hexdigest())"

Verify the beacon's BLS signature

Before accepting the randomness above, the platform checked drand's BLS12-381 signature for this round against this chain public key — a relay can withhold a round but cannot forge one without drand's private key. Fetch the round's 'signature' field from the URL above and verify e(H(round_bytes), public_key) == e(signature, G2_generator) yourself with any BLS12-381 library; source: https://drand.love/developer/http-api/.

83cf0f2896adee7eb8b5f01fcad3912212c437e0073e911fb90022d3e760183c8c4b450b6a0a6c3ac6a5776a2d1064510d1fec758c921cc22b0e17e63aaf4bcb5ed66304de9cf809bd274ca73bab4af5a6e9c76a4bc09e76eae8991ef5ece45a

Reproduce the winner selection (rejection sampling)

Starting at counter=0, compute sha256(f'legion-draw-v1:draw:{draw_secret}:{pool_hash}:{drand_randomness}:{counter}') as a 256-bit integer. Let limit be the largest multiple of N below 2^256. If the value is >= limit, increment counter and retry. Otherwise winner_index = value mod N.

counter=0, winner_index=9

Check It Yourself

Run every check in your own browser. It recomputes the hashes and the winner selection locally from the values published on this page, and fetches the drand round directly from the public relays — nothing is sent to our servers, so a pass cannot depend on trusting us.

Confirm sha256(draw_secret) equals the commitment hash in step 1.
Confirm the sha256 of the entry pool below equals the pool hash in step 3. Hash the text exactly as shown — ticket numbers in ascending numeric order, separated by commas, with no spaces and no trailing newline.

Entry pool — ticket numbers in ascending numeric order
9,18,24,28,31,35,38,40,44,60,62,69,71,74,80,81,95,97,103,119,120,127,149,152,156,158,159,160,161,163,167,170,172,179,181,185,189,191,192,195,203,209,213,223,232,237,239,242,248

Run the pre-filled command below to reproduce the beacon-seeded rejection-sampling winner index (counter=?, expected winner_index=9). This folds in the drand beacon randomness from the step above alongside the draw secret and pool hash, so the winner could not have been known until that round resolved.

python3 - <<'PY'
import hashlib
draw_secret = 'e4526e4420436bcd6c4e911d6fb143944cfccf707123fff991e8d76675b5473e'
pool_hash = 'd42f0ca6591d14768f88211d190715d3feb197cb375078e06d3aa55f52c5537a'
beacon_randomness = 'bcc62bd7d25fa301d5fb19cc6cdeef7b6d02db06d4c99d6db743786cfbba4c3d'
total_entries = 49
counter = 0
limit = (1 << 256) - ((1 << 256) % total_entries)
while True:
    seed = hashlib.sha256(f'legion-draw-v1:draw:{draw_secret}:{pool_hash}:{beacon_randomness}:{counter}'.encode()).digest()
    candidate = int.from_bytes(seed[:32], 'big')
    if candidate < limit:
        print(f'counter={counter} winner_index={candidate % total_entries}')
        break
    counter += 1
PY

Full Entry List

All sold tickets with entry method (no personal names). This competition had no engagement question, so the file carries no answer column. Download it to cross-reference ticket numbers against the draw pool; the "In Main Draw" column marks which rows formed it.

Download entry list CSV

Independent Timestamp Proof

Each commitment hash is anchored to the Bitcoin blockchain via OpenTimestamps. A confirmed proof establishes the hash existed before the Bitcoin block that attests it — checkable without trusting our records. Save the commitment hash to a file and check the proof with the free ots tool: printf '%s' 'COMMITMENT_HASH' > commitment.txt && ots verify -f commitment.txt proof.ots

Draw commitment — anchored in Bitcoin 24 Aug 2026 14:04 UTC

7ef4db3ae348ddf5a591cb9c2fa8ceda5e2a090c819f46b674575ad4e29790f2 Download OTS proof

Instant win commitment — anchored in Bitcoin 25 Aug 2026 15:04 UTC

ada27618129e5f9f5e22d8795bbcbeb0f3494ba6d9f16d1c03380a9e21ecef2e Download OTS proof

Pool freeze commitment — anchored in Bitcoin 1 Sep 2026 22:05 UTC

cab0dacfbcf39135a99e6cdbbaf1e2a2ba084793101a00f42a6ba9b74e7d1ae9

What this proof does and does not show: Bitcoin confirmation takes hours, while the targeted drand round resolves seconds after the pool freeze — so a confirmed proof here demonstrates the pool-freeze commitment existed before its attesting block, not that the freeze happened before the drand round. The freeze-before-round ordering rests on the commitment having been published before the round resolved (step 2 above) and on our audit records.

Download OTS proof